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Abstract—To facilitate monitoring and management, modern
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are often equipped with
wireless capabilities, which raise the risk of malicious access
to IMDs. Although schemes are proposed to secure the IMD
access, some issues are still open. First, pre-sharing a long-term
key between a patient’s IMD and a doctor’s programmer is
vulnerable since once the doctor’s programmer is compromised,
all of her patients suffer; establishing a temporary key by
leveraging proximity gets rid of pre-shared keys, but as the
approach lacks real authentication, it can be exploited by nearby
adversaries or through man-in-the-middle attacks. Second, while
prolonging the lifetime of IMDs is one of the most important
design goals, few schemes explore to lower the communication
and computation overhead all at once. Finally, how to safely
record the commands issued by doctors for the purpose of
forensics, which can be the last measure to protect the patients’
rights, is commonly omitted in the existing literature. Motivated
by these important yet open problems, we propose an innovative
scheme e-SAFE, which significantly improves security and safety,
reduces the communication overhead and enables IMD-access
forensics. We present a novel lightweight compressive sensing
based encryption algorithm to encrypt and compress the IMD
data simultaneously, reducing the data transmission overhead by
over 50% while ensuring high data confidentiality and usability.
Furthermore, we provide a suite of protocols regarding device
pairing, dual-factor authentication, and accountability-enabled
access. The security analysis and performance evaluation show
the validity and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Keywords—Implantable medical devices, authentication, access
control, compressive sensing
I. INTRODUCTION
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are gaining increas-
ing popularity in the medical industry. IMDs are embedded
into patients’ bodies to monitor their medical conditions by
collecting a range of physiological values (e.g., heart rate,
blood glucose and neural activity) and to provide specific
therapies (e.g., glucose injection or heart beat regulation) [1].
To make it more convenient to monitor patients’ health status
and manage IMDs’ configuration, many IMDs are equipped
with wireless interfaces, enabling wireless communication
between IMDs and an external device called programmer. A
doctor’s programmer can access the patient’s IMD to read
sensor data, and/or modify treatment configurations through
the on-board radios, which largely promotes patients’ mobility
and eliminating surgical procedures.
Unfortunately, most of the existing wireless medical de-
vices lack sufficient security mechanisms to protect patients
from malicious attacks. For example, implantable cardiac de-
fibrillators (ICDs) and pacemakers contain a magnetic switch
that can be activated by sufficiently strong magnetic field
[2]. Some research works [3], [4] have reported software
radio attacks against a commercial ICD and an insulin pump,
respectively. The attacks can steal the information stored in
the IMD and reprogram it to change the prescribed therapy.
McAfee’s Barnaby Jack showed that he could command the
delivery of a deadly 830-volt shock to pacemakers made by
several manufacturers at a distance up to 50 feet away [5].
The consequence of malicious access to IMDs can be fatal.
Therefore, the access to IMDs should be strictly controlled
to prevent the illegal exposure of patient data and the life-
threatening modification of its settings.
Due to the high computational complexity and energy con-
sumption, public-key cryptography is usually not suitable for
resource-restricted IMDs. Most of the solutions employ light-
weight symmetric cryptography based authentication schemes.
In this aspect, the most challenging issue is how to generate
and distribute the shared key for the secure channel estab-
lishment between an IMD and a programmer. Pre-loading
the shared key [3], [4], [6] between each pair of the IMD
and the programmer, is not practical and may not be secure.
Once a programmer is compromised, all the shared keys
stored in it may be leaked and all the corresponding IMDs
may be attacked by impersonating the programmer. Since
one patient can visit multiple doctors, the attack surface is
further enlarged. Some other schemes set up temporary keys
in a distributed manner based on proximity. They assume that
only the programmer operated by the doctor can get close
to the patient, and thus only it can extract the same key
materials as the IMD, such as electrocardiograms [7], vibration
[8], ultrasound [9]. However, this subclass of access control
schemes does not include a real authentication. Instead, they
solely rely on the assumption that the adversary is deterred
from being physically close to the patient to avoid leaving
criminal evidence.
Proxy-based schemes [10]–[12] are promising to mitigate
the limitations of IMDs’ computation and battery capacity
by mediating the communication between IMDs and pro-
grammers. However, the existing schemes are still vulnerable
to various attacks. Attackers can spoof the IMD that the
patient is in emergency by jamming the Cloaker to acquire
open access [10]. In IMDGuard [11], the patient’s time-varied
Electrocardiography (ECG) signals are used to establish the
secret key, assuming that ECG signals can only be measured
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
02
44
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
pr
 20
18
with skin contact. However, it was challenged by literature
[13] claiming that the effective key length can be reduced by
a man-in-the-middle attack, and literature [14] demonstrated
that ECG can be inferred by recording and analyzing a video
that contains the face of a person for a period of time.
By investigating existing schemes, we find most schemes
require either a hardware modification on IMDs or program-
mers to retrieve the key material sources (e.g., ECG, vibration,
etc.), or an dedicated proxy device. Moreover, the security and
robustness of generating key material based on proximity can
be impaired or even invalidated by various attacks. Last but
not the least, most, if not all, schemes only focus on how
to derive the shared key between the programmer and the
IMD (or the proxy), without considering the significant issues
about minimizing the power consumption of the energy-critical
IMDs and providing forensics [15] of critical operations on
IMDs by the authorized doctors.
Motivated by the above insights, we propose e-SAFE,
an efficient Secure-Access and Forensics-Enabled scheme, to
ensure the security of IMDs. In e-SAFE, the patient uses a
common smartphone rather than a dedicated device to perform
a dual-factor authentication on the requesting programmer.
Based on the shared key derived in the authentication, we
also present protocols for the read and write accesses to
IMDs. Any critical write operations performed by a doctor
is accountable. To make it more scalable and secure, the
programmer in our system does not store any security-related
materials of IMDs. We also present a novel efficient and secure
data transmission scheme based on compressive sensing (CS)
to provide confidentiality on the insecure wireless medical
telemetry and considerably reduce the communication over-
head, which usually accounts for approximately 70% power
consumption of IMDs.
Contributions. We summarize our main contributions as
follows.
1) We propose e-SAFE, which incorporates the common used
smartphone as a proxy. A patient’s smartphone can be used
to conduct dual-factor authentication and access control on
the requesting programmer. Accountability and emergency
treatment are supported.
2) We design a novel compressive sensing based encryption
algorithm that fits in with our system architecture and
considerably reduces the transmission overhead in IMDs
without introducing additional computation overhead.
3) We provide security analyses of the e-SAFE scheme’s
resistance to various passive and active attacks.
4) We implement a prototype of the system and conduct
performance evaluation to validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the threat model, the system
objectives, and the proposed system architecture.
A. Threat Model
Potential adversaries include passive and active attackers.
Passive attackers simply eavesdrop on the wireless chan-
nel to obtain private information; they neither modify the
message in the channel, nor communicate with the patient’s
smartphone or IMD. Besides eavesdropping, active attackers
may intercept, tamper with or replay messages in a wireless
channel to launch various attacks. The objective of active
attacks includes obtaining the patient’s private information or
sending malicious commands to disturb the normal functions
of IMDs. We assume that attackers have regular computational
bounds, e.g., they cannot perform efficient brute force attacks
to solve the discrete logarithm problem. However, we make
no assumption on the attacker’s communication capability.
They may be able to eavesdrop the wireless channel, block
messages, and even hijack the communication between entities
in the system. Attacks by exploiting operating system or
firmware vulnerabilities [16], malware [17], etc., are beyond
the scope of this paper.
B. System Objectives
Security: In general, safety, confidentiality, and integrity
are considered in a secure system [18]. In terms of safety,
IMDs should only be accessible to authorized programmers
used by authenticated doctors, and any write access to the
IMD should be accountable in case of a medical dispute. As
for privacy, the patient’s physiological data and treatment data
should be kept confidential in wireless transmission. Besides,
integrity ensures that critical data cannot be modified by
unauthorized entities and its origin could be verified.
Low Overhead: The computation and communication
overhead in the patient’s devices, especially the IMD, should
be minimized to save power consumption.
Flexible Architecture: While a patient is usually equipped
with the same IMD for a period of time, he may see different
doctors in different clinics, healthcare centers or hospitals.
Hence, the scheme should allow an IMD to be accessed by
multiple programmers safely.
C. System Architecture
The system comprises three major entities: IMD, Smart-
phone and Programmer, as shown in Fig. 1.
Bluetooth
Wireless Medical Telemetry
② Authentication
③ Read and Write Acess
Authorization
① Pairing
Programmer
IMD
CSE(data)
Figure 1. System Architecture
• IMD: A patient’s IMD is equipped with a Bluetooth module
to communicate with his smartphone within a limited dis-
tance. The IMD communicates with a doctor’s programmer
through the conventional wireless medical telemetry.
• Smartphone: Every patient and each doctor hold a smart-
phone. The patient’s smartphone communicates with his
IMD via Bluetooth, and communicates with a programmer
wirelessly, e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi, or cellular networks.
• Programmer: The programmer refers to the device used
by doctors in medical centers or hospitals. The programmer
can read from or write to the patient’s IMD. The program-
mer may also have interfaces for external I/O and storage
devices, i.e., a keyboard and a USB flash drive.
Besides, at the initialization phase in our system, a public
key infrastructure (PKI) is used to issue a private/public key
pair and a certificate to each doctor. This is only a one-
time cost at the initialization phase. After the initialization,
our scheme does not need a PKI to verify the identity and
public key of a doctor. Furthermore, this kind of basic PKI
is common in many e-health applications and becomes an
essential security entity with the development of e-health.
III. SECURE AND EFFICIENT IMD DATA TRANSMISSION
In this section, we first present a novel encryption frame-
work based on compressive sensing for secure and efficient
IMD data transmission. Then we briefly discuss the potential
improvement on data compression by uniform quantification.
A. Background: Compressive Sensing
Compressive sensing [19], [20] combines traditional sens-
ing and compressing into a single process by exploiting
data sparsity. Let x ∈ RN be a real-valued N -dimensional
original signal that can be sparsely represented on a certain
orthonormal basis. x is s-sparse if x can be expanded upon
a basis Ψ ∈ RN×N with no more than s non-zero coefficient
entries, i.e., x = Ψb, where b ∈ RN is the sparse vector
satisfying ||b||0 ≤ s. In the sensing process, the original signal
vector is multiplied by a sensing matrix Φ ∈ RM×N that
is incoherent with Ψ, obtaining the M -measurements vector
y = Φx. As M  N , the original signal x is compressed to
y, with a compressing rate CR = 100(N −M)/N . Thus, the
compressive sensing process is expressed as:
y = Φx = ΦΨb = Θb (1)
To ensure robust and precise recovery from x, Φ should
satisfy the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP). RIP of order s
and level δs ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., (s, δs)-RIP) is satisfied if
(1− δs)||b||2 ≤ ||ΦΨb||2 ≤ (1 + δs)||b||2 (2)
holds for all s-sparse b ∈ R. If RIP holds, the sparse vector
b can be estimated by solving the basis pursuit (BP) problem
in (3):
min
bˆ∈RN
||bˆ||1 subjects to y = ΦΨbˆ (3)
There already exist a number of algorithms to reconstruct the
original signal, e.g., orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) [21],
gradient projection [22], etc.
B. Motivation
Implantable and wearable medical devices usually acquire
sparse signals that can be sensed by compressive sensing, a
promising technique to provide efficient and secure transmis-
sion for IMD devices due to the following features. First,
it can provide a high compression rate since its sampling
rate is lower than the Nyquist rate, which is 2 times of the
signal’s bandwidth. Second, the computation overhead for
sensing is much lower than that for signal reconstruction.
Besides, compressive sensing can provide data encryption by
viewing the sensing matrix Φ as a secret key, without which
it is computationally difficult to recover x from y = Φx [23],
[24]. Therefore, the IMD can combine data compression and
encryption into a single operation by a CS-based algorithm.
However, pre-sharing Φ between each IMD and each of
its accessing programmers is neither flexible nor safe. A
straightforward alternative in our architecture may be that the
smartphone generates and distributes a Φ to the IMD and the
programmer in each session. Nevertheless, it is not practical
since receiving such a large matrix causes too much commu-
nication overhead for IMDs. To solve the above problems, we
propose a novel CS-based encryption algorithm (CSE) which
fits well with the proxy-based system architecture.
C. CS-Based Encryption Algorithm
In our setting, both the sparse matrix Ψ and the sensing
matrix Φ are public. Before presenting the CSE algorithm, we
first introduce the related operations in Definitions 1-3.
Definition 1. (Shifting Addition). The shifting addition of two
random variables v ∈ (L1, L2) ⊂ R and w ∈ R outputs
(u, λ) ← v/⊕w, such that u = (v + w − L1) mod (L2 −
L1)+L1, where L1, L2 ∈ Z. λ ∈ (0, 1) is set to 0 if (v+w) ∈
[L1, L2); otherwise, λ = 1.
Definition 2. (Vectorial Shifting Addition). If all entries in v
are i.i.d. and have a finite range, the vectorial shifting addition
of two vectors v,w ∈ RN×1 can be computed by (u,Λ) ←
v/⊕w. Let vi, wi, ui, λi, i = 1, · · · , N be entries of v,w,u ∈
RN×1, Λ ∈ (0, 1)N×1, respectively, and (ui, λi)← vi/⊕wi.
Definition 3. (Vectorial Entry-wise Product). The entry-wise
product of two same-sized vectors v,w ∈ RN×1 is defined as
v. ∗w = (v1 ∗w1, · · · , vN ∗wN ), where vi, wi, i = 1, · · · , N
are entries of v,w, respectively.
Based on the above operations, the CSE algorithm is
defined in the following.
Definition 4. (CSE Algorithm). An energy-efficient CS-Based
encryption scheme on the original signal x whose entries are
bounded in (L1, L2), where L1, L2 ∈ Z, is defined as CSE =
(CSGen,CSEnc,CSDec) such that,
Kd ← CSGen(sd, k): is a simple random generation
algorithm run by the smartphone, which utilizes a pseudo-
random function (PRF) seeded by sd to generate k random
di ∈ [−drange/2e, drange/2e] ⊂ Z, where i = 1, 2, · · · , k
and range = L2 − L1, then Kd = (d1, · · · , dk)T.
(y′,Λ) ← CSEnc(Kd,x): is some simple vector and
matrix operations run by the IMD to encrypt the patient data.
It takes as input a secret key Kd, the original data x and also
the public Φ, and outputs the compressed and encrypted data
y′, i.e., (p,Λ)← (x/⊕Kd); y′ = Φp.
xˆ← CSDec(Kd,y′,Λ): includes a vector operation and
a reconstruction algorithm typically for compressive sensing,
performed by the programmer. It takes as input Kd, y′, Λ
and Φ, and outputs the estimation xˆ of the original data x. In
the first step, it gets the real compressed data y from y′ by
(4), where sign = (d1/|d1|, · · · , dN/|dN |) and represents the
shifting direction.
y = Φx = y′ + Φ((L2 − L1)Λ. ∗ sign−Kd) (4)
After getting y, an estimation xˆ of x can be derived by a
reconstruction algorithm that solves the problem in (3).
D. Further Optimization: Uniform Quantification
Typically, the output of CSEnc is finite precision floating
values since the original IMD data x is a natural signal. To
further compress the data transmission, we simply quantify the
Table I. NOTATIONS
Symbol Description
S, I,D,DS A patient’s smartphone, IMD, a doctor’s
programmer, phone, resp.
Rj Message headings
IDp The identity of p ∈ {S, I,D,DS}
SN0, SN Session numbers
TSi Timestamps, i = 1, 2, · · · , 8
kdf(·) Key derivation function [25]
Sig(key,msg) RSA signature function
HMAC(key,msg) SHA1-HMAC function
AESEnc(key,msg) AES encryption function
RSAEnc(key,msg) RSA encryption function
CSEnc(key,msg) CS-based encryption function
Table II. REQUEST TYPES
j Type j Type j Type
1 pair req 6 read allow 11 write ready
2 pair succ 7 read ready 12 write req
3 auth req 8 read req 13 set allow
4 optional 9 write auth req 14 write succ
5 read auth req 10 write allow
output y′ with a quantification step qs, obtaining y′′. Then
there are m = range/qs values for the elements in the output
of CSEnc. The communication overhead in transmission of
IMD data can thus be lowered. Moreover, if m is small enough,
it is possible for IMDs to encode y′ after quantification by
searching a pre-stored small-size code table, e.g., Huffman
coding table. We do not discuss encoding in details since it is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it can significantly reduce
the communication cost.
IV. E-SAFE SCHEME
In this section, we will present the details of our e-SAFE
scheme, including four parts: 1) system initialization; 2) device
pairing; 3) dual-factor authentication; 4) authorization and
access. Headings Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 14 are used to denote
different request types in our protocols. The notations used
in this paper and the correspondence between j and request
types are given in Table I and II, respectively.
A. System Initialization
Each IMD has a hardcoded master key K and an identity
IDI issued by the device manufacturer and included in the
product specification uniquely associated with the device.
The programmer pre-stores nothing before a doctor loads
some information into it by inserting a secure USB device.
A doctor’s dedicated USB device stores her identity IDD
and private/public key pair SK and PK together with the
corresponding public-key certificate CertPK , issued by a
trusted PKI whose public key is PKCA. With the certificate,
the legitimacy of the doctor’s public key can be verified.
The patient’s smartphone with an identify IDS needs
to pre-store the CA’s public key, the doctor’s identity and
office phone number or email address. This is reasonable and
practical since the patient usually needs to contact and make
an appointment with the doctor, and the doctor’s office phone
number or email address is publicly available. The doctor’s
phone IDDS does not pre-store any information.
B. Device Pairing
In our scheme, the patient uses his smartphone to perform
authentication and authorization when an external programmer
requests to access his IMD. To this end, the patient’s smart-
phone and IMD should pair with each other to establish a
secure channel. The existing pairing schemes in the Bluetooth
protocol stack cannot satisfy our pairing requirement. The
IMD is not supposed to know any information about the
requesting smartphone, since the pairing process may happen
when enrolling a new smartphone if the previously paired one
is not available, e.g., it is broken, stolen, etc. Moreover, the
patient cannot physically control the IMD to select the target
smartphone after the IMD is implanted.
Table III. DEVICE PAIRING PROCESS
(i) S→ I R1||SN0||IDS||TS1||HMAC1
Ki = kdf(K||IDS||IDI)
HMAC1 = HMAC(Ki, [R1||SN0||IDS||TS1])
(ii) I→ S R2||SN0
Therefore, we design an application-layer device pairing
protocol, as shown in Table III. The patient manually enters
into his smartphone the master key K to generate a shared
key Ki, and then sends a pairing request to his IMD as in (i).
After checking HMAC1 with the key generated in the same
way, the IMD notifies the success of pairing. Thereafter, the
smartphone and IMD use Ki to establish a secure channel.
C. Dual-Factor Authentication
The patient’s smartphone needs to authenticate the pro-
grammer held by a doctor before authorizing the programmer
to access. We propose a two-factor authentication that verifies
both the legality of the doctor and her programmer. The
authentication approach is described in Table IV.
Table IV. AUTHENTICATION PROCESS
(iii) D→ S R3||SN||IDD||TS2||PK||CertPK
(iv) S→ D SN||IDS||RSAEnc(PK, [nonce])
(v) S→ DS RM
(vi) D→ S R4||SN||TS3||HMAC2
Kp = kdf(RM ||SN||nonce)
HMAC2 = HMAC(Kp, [R4||SN||IDD||IDS||TS3])
The programmer firstly sends to the patient’s smartphone
the doctor’s public key PK and certificate CertPK to initiate
an authentication process. The patient’s smartphone verifies
the legitimacy of PK by checking CertPK , and then sends
a nonce encrypted with the public key PK. Besides, the
patient’s smartphone sends a random message RM to the
doctor’s phone via a secure message service, e.g., SMS or
email. Once receiving RM , the doctor enters it into her
programmer manually; hence human involvement is integrated
into authentication. Note that only the doctor’s programmer
and the patient’s smartphone can derive a key Kp from
RM and nonce. The smartphone can then authenticate the
programmer by checking HMAC2 after receiving it.
Table V. READ ACCESS PROCESS
(vi) D→ S R5||SN||TS4||HMAC3
HMAC3 = HMAC(Kp, [R5||SN||TS4])
(vii) S→ I R6||SN||IDD||C1||TS5||HMAC4
Kr = kdf(Kd||SN)
C1 = AESEnc(Ki, [Kd, Kr])
HMAC4 = HMAC(Ki, [R6||SN||IDD||C1||TS5])
(viii) I→ S R7||SN
(ix) S→ D R7||SN||AESEnc(Kp, [Kd])
(x) D→ I R8||SN
(xi) I→ D SN||C2||HMAC5
C2 = CSEnc(Kd, data)
HMAC5 = HMAC(Kr, [SN||C2])
(vi) is shown here for presenting the mechanism of the
dual-factor authentication. It is always overridden by the first
step of a read process to initiate an access request, which is
discussed in Section IV-D.
D. Authorization and Access
The programmer is authorized to request accesses to the
IMD when it shares Kp with the patient’s smartphone. The
programmer may need a read access to retrieve physiological
data data from the IMD, or sometimes a write access to send
a command CMD to change the therapy configuration of the
IMD based on the analysis of the obtained data. The respective
protocols are presented in this subsection.
1) Read Process: After authenticated, the doctor’s pro-
grammer initiates a read access process by running the protocol
illustrated in Table V. In this protocol, the programmer first
requests a read access authentication by sending a message
including HMAC3 to the patient’s smartphone in (vi). The
smartphone then allows the IMD to accept the programmer’s
read request and distributes the CSE key Kd and the derived
symmetric key Kr to the IMD in (vii). After the IMD returns
“read ready”, the smartphone forwards the IMD’s status and
distributes Kd to the programmer in (ix). When receiving the
programmer’s read request in (x), the IMD sends the CSEnc-
ed patient data C2 to the programmer. The plaintext of patient
data can be obtained by running CSDec(·) on C2.
2) Write Process: According to the patient’s physiological
data, the doctor may need to change the treatment config-
uration by sending a command CMD to the patient’s IMD,
which is a critical operation that can affect the patient’s health
and probably even life. Our protocol incorporates a signature-
based forensics method for the patient’s smartphone to record
the doctor’s operations in case of medical disputes. The write
access process is shown in Table VI. When requesting for
write access authentication, the programmer sends to the
patient’s smartphone an RSA signature of information that
describes an event “a doctor IDD sends a command CMD
to an IMD IDI at TS6 based on the data obtained from
C2 with Kd”, as shown in (xii). The IMD is activated to
accept write access in (xiii). After being notified of the IMD’s
“write ready” status in (xv), the programmer sends CMD
to the IMD. (xvii) and (xviii) are executed for forensics
purpose. When receiving CMD and C2 from the IMD, the
smartphone can verify the validity of Sig and retain a tuple
〈IDD, IDS, IDI,Kd,C2,CMD,TS6, Sig〉 as the evidence of
the doctor’s write operation. Then, the smartphone allows the
IMD to change its configuration according to CMD in (xviii).
Table VI. WRITE ACCESS PROCESS
(xii) D→ S R9||SN||Sig||TS6||HMAC6
Sig = Sig(SK, [IDD||IDS||IDI||C2||Kd||CMD||TS6])
HMAC6 = HMAC(Kp, [R9||SN||Sig||TS6])
(xiii) S→ I R10||SN||IDD||TS7||HMAC7
HMAC7 = HMAC(Ki, [R10||SN||IDD||TS7])
(xiv) I→ S R11||SN
(xv) S→ D R11||SN
(xvi) D→ I R12||SN||C3||HMAC8
C3 = AESEnc(Kr, [CMD])
HMAC8 = HMAC(Kr, [R12||SN||C3])
(xvii) I→ S SN||C2||AESEnc(Ki, [CMD||IDI]||TS7)
(xviii) S→ I R13||SN||TS8||HMAC9
HMAC9 = HMAC(Ki, [R13||SN||TS8])
(xix) I→ D R14||SN
V. SECURITY AND SAFETY ANALYSIS
A. Resistance to Passive Attacks
To avoid being disclosed to wireless eavesdroppers, all
to-be-transmitted sensitive data are protected in our scheme,
including the security-related parameters (i.e., nonce, Kd
and Kr) and CMD that may also reveal a patient’s health
condition. The patient’s physiological data are protected by
CSE. Since Kd is dynamically updated in different sessions,
chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) does not motivate the attacker.
We thus consider a ciphertext-only attack (COA) model when
analyzing the secrecy of CSE.
CSE obfuscates the original signal x by introducing a
pre-measurement i.i.d. uniformly random noise (Kd). We
show that the distribution of x/⊕Kd is statistically close to
O/⊕Kd, where O ∈ RN×1 is a zero vector.
Theorem 1. The noised signal x/⊕Kd and a noised zero
signal O/⊕Kd are statistically indistinguishable.
Proof: Regarding each entry in x/⊕Kd and O/⊕Kd,
we have two hypotheses H0 and H1, whose ranges are both
[−L1, L2). The optimal distinguishing strategy is not better
than a random guess from (0, 1). Consider the correlation
between entries in x, the distinguisher’s success probability
is Pr = 12 + µ(x). The negligible function µ(x) → 0
because each entry in x has a random cyclic shift within
[L1, L2). Therefore, x/⊕Kd and O/⊕Kd are statistically
indistinguishable.
By making the distribution of x close to that of Kd, we
break x’s sparsity, which is the underlying basis of recon-
struction. Now consider the effect of noise Kd quantitatively
when applying compressive sensing. Literature [26] presents a
detailed proof that the pre-measurement zero-mean white noise
(i.e., Kd) with covariance σ20I degrades the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) by a factor of γ = N/M in compressive sensing,
which is called noise folding. Based on this conclusion, the
reconstruction from y = Φ(x + Kd) approximates roughly to
solving the additive noise model y = Φx + z, where z is a
white noise with variance σ2 = γσ20 .
Hence, our CSEnc, at the worst case where few entries are
shifted, is equivalent to adding a γ larger white noise to the
CS measurement of x. In this case, the reconstruction error
bound for noised measurement has been widely studied in the
compressive sensing domain. Suppose the public Φ,Ψ satisfy
the 2s-th RIP condition, according to Wang et al.’s work [27],
the error bound gain ∆ECSE by applying Kd is,
∆ECSE ≤ 4
√
1 + δ2s
1− δ2s −
√
2δ2s
σ2 (5)
where δ2s <
√
2 − 1. Assume that δ2s = 0.3, we have
∆ECSE ≤ 16.54σ2. Note that the variance of the original
signal x is even much smaller than σ0. The high error gain
guarantees CSEnc-ed data irrecoverability without Kd.
B. Resistance to Active Attacks
1) Impersonation Attack: To impersonate a legitimate doc-
tor, the attacker needs to have both the doctor’s public/private
key pairs PK and SK stored in a USB drive and the doctor’s
phone to pass the dual-factor authentication. In the worst
case, the attacker gains both a doctor’s USB lost drive and
smartphone; theoretically, the attacker can impersonate a real
doctor to gain access to a patient’s IMD. Our scheme mitigates
this threat through human involvement in the system design,
preventing the IMDs from being access covertly; the attacker
would need to meet the patient physically in the hospital or
clinic, which makes this attack impractical.
2) Replay Attack: Our scheme can defend the replay at-
tacks. First, we include a session number and timestamp in
critical steps that are vulnerable to replay attacks. Second, all
the processes are enforced to be single-threaded, i.e., every
device only responds to the request it expects in the current
session. Last but not least, HMAC checks based on dynamic
keys Kp,Kr can also defend against replay attacks.
3) Man-in-the-Middle Attack: A man-in-the-middle attack
can be conducted if an attacker is able to intercept all the
messages in the communication links. A possible man-in-the-
middle attack targeted in revealing patient data is shown in
Fig. 2. The fake programmer manipulated by the attacker
blocks the outgoing communication links of the doctor’s
programmer and impersonates the real programmer to send the
blocked messages. However, the fake programmer can only
obtain the ciphertext C2 instead of data. The attacker can
generate neither the secret key Kp without RM nor Ki without
IMD’s master key K, thus cannot get Kd. Consequently, the
attacker cannot reconstruct data which is protected by the
CSE. Likewise, the fake programmer cannot obtain or modify
the doctor’s command CMD without the keys.
Programmer Smartphone IMD
Fake Programmer p
ait
en
t d
ata
Figure 2. Man-in-the-middle attack in read process
C. Emergency Open Access
Since human intervention is required in the authentication,
the emergency situation should be carefully considered. That
is, even when a patient is unable to assist the authentication,
e.g., he goes into a coma, any programmer from the first
emergency responder can still access the IMD to give him
emergency treatment. Our scheme can deal with this case:
the doctor uses the patient’s smartphone to send a random
message to her own phone to complete the authentication
protocol. We recommend that the patient uses his fingerprint
to unlock the smartphone as fingerprints have been widely
used and the responder can use the patient’s fingerprint to
unlock his phone even if he is in a comma. Moreover, the
device pairing enables a new smartphone to be paired with the
IMD, in case that the previously paired smartphone is lost. The
extreme condition that the patient’s smartphone is lost when
he becomes unconscious is beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Settings
The main challenge in IMD experiments is that the source
codes and open platforms from commercial vendors are not
available. We choose TelosB with TinyOS 2.1 and Rasberry
Pi version 3 Model B with Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system, which
are open research platforms for resource constrained systems,
as a replacement of the IMD and the programmer, respectively,
and implement the prototype of our proposed scheme. We skip
the SMS/email test on smartphone since it is widely used in
mobile applications. We use a Sandisk USB drive to store the
doctor’s identity, public/private keys and certificate.
We use the ECG data records from MIT-BIH Arrhythmia
Database [28] to validate the proposed data compression and
privacy scheme. Each ECG data record in the database is
resampled as a 2-second signal at 256 Hz. We select Φ
from an independent identically distribution (i.i.d) Gaussian
distributionN (0, 1/N) sampling and exploit a Discrete Fourier
Transformation (DFT) basis as the sparse matrix Ψ.
B. Evaluation Results
In this subsection, we present the evaluation results. We
employ the widely used percentage root-mean square differ-
ence (PRD) [29] which quantifies the percent error between
the original signal vector x and the recovered xˆ, to measure
the quality of the recovered signal. PRD also serves as an
important security metric in our paper, indicating the secrecy
degree that the CSE achieves. PRD is defined as
PRD =
||x− xˆ||2
||x||2 × 100 (6)
Zigel et al.’s work [30] classifies the different values of PRD
based on signal quality perceived by a specialist. We use their
results as a way to evaluate PRD, as is shown in Table VII:
Table VII. PRD AND CORRESPONDING QUALITY
PRD Recovered Signal Quality
0 ∼ 2% ”Very good”
2 ∼ 9% ”Very good” or ”good”
≥ 9% ”Not good”
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(f) Random guess attack in multiple trials
Figure 3. Usability and secrecy evaluation on data transmission under different situations.
1) Data Usability: In this paper, the challenge of data us-
ability resides in the reconstruction quality from the compres-
sive sensed and quantified data. We establish an experiment to
evaluate the performance of data usability.
We firstly give a view of the snapshot of recovery in Fig.
3(a) where CR = 50 and qs = 20. The original signal
can be recovered almost perfectly when no quantification is
applied. When the compressed signal y′ is quantified with
qs = 20, the recovery quality degrades slightly, but it’s still
in the “very good” class. The result indicates it is effective to
apply compressive sensing to sparse IMD data, which requires
to be acquired and transmitted accurately enough.
We test the signal reconstruction from compressed signal
with quantification step qs = 〈10, 20, 30, 60, 100, 120〉 and
from non-quantified compressed signal to study how quan-
tification affects the signal reconstruction. The test result is
shown in Fig. 3(b). We can see that PRD increases with the
growth of CR, since compression can inevitably lose some
information in the original signal. We can achieve at least
”good” recoverability even when qs = 100, compressing
signals by 90%. It is clear that PRD grows with the increase of
qs. This is because quantification makes the compressed signal
y obtained by the receiver less accurate. When a smaller qs
is used (10 or 20), we can even gain a “very good” signal
recovery with CR ≤ 60. The result shows we have a large
feasibility in the tradeoff between reducing the communication
overhead and ensuring the data precision.
2) Secrecy in Data Transmission: The upper and lower
bounds of ECG data used in our experiment are 1487 and
590, respectively, so we choose di randomly from [−449, 449].
Without Kd = (d1, · · · , dN )T, COA attackers may attempt a
uniform guess by assigning the same value d¯ to all di to derive
the real compressed data y. Then attackers can try different
values for d¯ and perform reconstruction algorithms to get the
approximation xˆ of the original signal x. To further study the
effectiveness of this attack, we test the PRD of this attack
under different d¯ and CR. The result is shown in Fig. 3(c).
From Fig. 3(c), the PRD minimizes when d¯ = 0, i.e., the
best recovery this attack can achieve is executing reconstruc-
tion algorithm directly on the received y′ or y′′. Adding large
enough random noise to the original signal has destroyed its
sparsity, so the uniform guess attack has a poor performance.
We set up another experiment to compare the reconstruc-
tion quality by the legitimate receiver and the optimal uniform
guess attacker under non-quantified and quantified situations.
The result is shown in Fig. 3(d) and 3(e). Fig. 3(d) gives a
snapshot of the ECG record 230. The recovered signals deviate
from the original signal in an irregular manner. In Fig. 3(e),
the normally recovered signals have a “very good” quality,
while the attacker only gets a bad recovery quality, no matter
whether the encrypted signal is quantified. The results prove
the secrecy provided by CSE.
Besides the uniform guess, we also consider a random
guess, where attackers guess values of di randomly as how
the smartphone generates. We repeat the random guess for 100
times and extract the PRDs under different CR. The result in
Fig. 3(f) indicates the random guess still can only obtain a
“not good” quality.
3) Overhead Analysis: We focus on the computation and
communication overhead on the IMD, since IMDs have very
limited capacities and are hard to charge or replace. We test
the execution time of different operations on our testbed, as
shown in Table VIII. The execution time TCSEnc of CS-based
encryption relates tightly to the compression ratio (50, 75, 90
in Table VIII) which influences the size of Φ.
Table VIII. EXECUTION TIME OF DIFFERENT OPERATIONS
Operation Execution Time (ms)
PBKDF2 [25] 98.324
128-bit AES encryption 0.736
128-bit AES decryption 1.184
HMAC-SHA1 0.987
CS-based encryption (CR=50,75,95) 2.205,0.844,0.234, resp.
Then we summarize the crypto-operations the IMD exe-
cutes in each process, as shown in Table IX. Thus, if n denotes
the number of 2-second ECG data to be transmitted in the read
process, the IMD consumes 99.311, 3.158 + n · TCSEnc, and
4.881 ms for dealing with operations included in Table IX in
pairing, read, write processes, respectively. Note that the pair-
ing process is only required the first time IMD was implanted,
or the patient wants to pair another smartphone. IMDs attends
other processes only when the patients come to see a doctor.
Therefore, the extra computation overheads are acceptable for
the user experience and IMD power consumption.
Table IX. CRYPTO-OPERATION SUMMARY IN EACH PROTOCOL
Process AES Enc AES Dec HMAC KDF CS Enc
Pair N/A N/A 1 1 N/A
Auth N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Read N/A 1 2 N/A n
Write 1 1 3 N/A N/A
From Fig. 3(b), we can conclude that our CS-based en-
cryption can achieve a compression ratio CR = 85 when
qs = 100, and CR = 95 when qs = 60 for “good” quality,
and CR = 50 when qs = 20 and CR = 60 when qs = 10
for “very good” quality. Therefore, our CS-based encryption
scheme can reduce the communication overhead by over 50%.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. IMD Access Control
Although various key management and access control
schemes [31]–[34] have been proposed for building secure
applications, few can be directly applied to secure IMD access.
Some works use a pre-loaded key. Halperin et al. [3] proposed
to have all programmers carry a master key that can generate
the IMD-specific key, using the device identity and a nonce
provided by the IMD. However, forcing all IMD manufacturers
to use the same master key is not realistic. The pre-loaded key
can also be in the form of a rolling code [4] or wake-up code
[6]. Some other works proposed to utilize the patient’s biolog-
ical features3 or physical objects in the patient’s possession
[35], where the device key can be extracted from. However,
the adversary could also find a way to illegally and secretly
gain the bio-features or codes carried by the objects.
Another group of related works depends on symmetric
temporary keys generated and/or distributed in real-time while
the programmer is accessing the IMD in proximity. During
key generation, the programmer and the IMD measure the
same source, e.g. electrocardiogram signal (ECG) [7], inter-
pulse interval [36]. The key distribution can be achieved via
channels like body-coupled communications [37], vibration
[8], ultrasound [9], and near field communication [38].
Due to the limitations of IMD’s computation and battery
capacity, a proxy can be utilized to delegate the authentication
on behalf of the IMD. Denning et al. [10] proposed to use an
externally worn device Cloaker to check whether an external
programmer is authorized to communicate with the IMD, and
to provide open access to all programmers by disabling the
Cloaker. The Cloaker leverages heavyweight public key cryp-
tography to verify the signature of the requesting programmer.
Another scheme IMDGuard is designed in [11], in which a
dedicated wearable device Guardian is used to control the
external programmer’s access. The IMD and Guardian measure
the patient’s ECG signals simultaneously, from which a pair
of shared keys is extracted to secure the link between the IMD
and the Guardian. Therefore, an adversary cannot forge a fake
Guardian except by making physical contact with the patient.
Gollakota et al. [12] presented Shield, which can defend
against both eavesdropping and active attacks. Shield is a
jammer-cum-receiver that receives the IMD’s message while
jamming others from decoding the message. Besides, Shield
jams any other device’s signal from communicating directly
with the IMD, so that the adversary cannot trick the IMD into
executing an unauthorized command. Zheng et al. [39] pro-
posed BodyDouble, a non-key based scheme which employs
an authentication proxy embedded in a gateway to authenticate
a programmer.
B. Compressive Sensing
Compressive sensing [19], [20] was first proposed for sig-
nal processing due to the feature that it unifies signal sensing
and compression into signal acquisition and subsequently ap-
plied to various fields. Recently, compressive sensing has been
extensively researched in the security and privacy domain,
especially in scenarios where data need to be encrypted in
resource-constrained devices while decrypted in entities with
strong capabilities. Literature [23], [24] showed that CS-based
encryption can achieve computational security when keeping
the sensing matrix secret. Fragkiadakis et al. [40] showed
that the above CS-based encryption is vulnerable to Chosen
Plaintext Attacks and proposed a scheme based on chaotic
sequences to resist CPA attacks. Zhang et al. [41] evaluated
the performance of encompression (encryption+compression)
on commercial embedded sensor platforms, showing that with
a reasonable compression, encompression could considerably
reduce the communication overhead and total energy con-
sumption. Wang et al. [42] formulated a privacy-preserving
healthcare monitoring system for image data, employing com-
pressive sensing to reduce the energy consumption of sensors
by outsourcing the reconstruction to the cloud.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A novel and practical system e-SAFE is presented to
solve the access control and efficient transmission problems
for IMDs. We enhance the practicality of our scheme by
utilizing the most popular and handy device, smartphone, as
a proxy to undertake most of the security-related tasks. The
smartphone and IMD establish a trusted channel by sharing
a secret key derived from a master key that is physically
inaccessible to attackers. We authenticate the doctor who is
responsible for all operations on patient’s IMDs. We also
give the keying material for authorizing access privileges to
the doctor’s programmer through the widely used SMS/email
service. The patients and doctors are involved to perform
critical operations manually for the authentication, reducing
the chance that allows attackers to perform covert attacks. The
patient’s smartphone can keep evidence of the issued critical
commands to his IMD for potential forensics. Experiment
results based on our testbed demonstrate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our scheme.
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